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Metaphysics - Low in Price, High in Value: A Critique of Global 
Expressivism 
 
1. Introduction1 
Neopragmatism is currently a burgeoning area of philosophical research, and Huw Price is 
positioned as a key heir of its originary figure Richard Rorty.2 In the late 1960s and early ‘70s, 
Rorty famously burst onto an Anglo-American philosophical scene largely dominated by still-
positivistic analytic philosophy3 and initiated a great revival for pragmatism. This intervention 
provoked a significant counter-reaction.4 Rorty’s ideas were widely viewed as blithely 
disregarding important issues such as whether reality exists, and if so what is its nature, and 
erasing the possibility of principled distinctions between ground-breaking scientific inquiry, 
great works of Western Philosophy, and any other “kind of writing” (Rorty 1978, pp. 141-160). 
That Rorty not only engaged philosophically with ‘Continental’ figures such as Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Derrida, but arranged them alongside core analytic authors such as Quine in 
creative thematic comparisons, only made the counter-reaction more intense. 
     By contrast, Price claims to situate neo-pragmatist insights within a more sober and 
respectable naturalism. He has enriched philosophical debate with a distinction between object 
naturalism, which pertains to the world at large, and subject naturalism, which pertains solely 
to us humans. But what Price means by naturalism turns out to be in effect largely the 
exhortation: Do not engage in any metaphysics!5 Our paper is directed against this aspect of 
Price’s thought. First, we will suggest that understanding naturalism as defined against 
metaphysics is misguided if one considers the goals of the ‘natural’ sciences which allegedly 
inspire the view. (We shall argue that metaphysics should be understood as a sufficiently 
general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality.) Secondly, we will argue that Price 
himself is philosophically inconsistent – his recent work is replete with metaphysical 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Thomas Dabay and Joshua Black for philosophical interactions which significantly improved 
this paper. 
2 For example, Robert Brandom writes, “Huw Price is one of the boldest and most original voices of pragmatism 
in the generation after Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam” (Brandom, in Price 2013, p. 85).  
3 Analytic philosophy at the time arguably thought of itself as post-positivist, due for instance to Quine’s critique 
of Carnap. We disagree with this self-assessment. We do not have space here to argue the matter, but see (Redding 
2010, p. 20). 
4 For an overview, see (Misak 2013, pp. 225-228). 
5 Here we differ from Horwich’s 2013 critique of Price as allegedly trying to “derive metaphysical theories from 
linguistic premises” (Horwich, in Price 2013, p. 114). We feel that this critique does not do sufficient justice to 
Price’s overarching goal of quietism, adumbrated in particular detail in (Macarthur and Price 2007). 
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assumptions. We will identify and discuss the two we see as most substantial: dualism and 
nominalism.  
     We begin by outlining in sections 2 and 3 key features of Price’s naturalism and his 
arguments for it. In section 4 we argue that Price is committed to dualism on a number of levels, 
which problematically cements an in-principle lack of explanation across these dualistic 
divides, thereby compromising his naturalism. In section 5 we argue that Price is committed to 
nominalism concerning the meaning of general terms through his metaphysical quietism and 
functional pluralism, which undermines the objective purport of the overall view he seeks to 
establish (namely global expressivism). We believe these discussions are important to have as 
the question of whether it is acceptable for philosophers to value the pursuit of metaphysics – 
and if so, why and how it should be pursued – has significant implications for the heart and 
soul of pragmatism as it continues to develop its newly-revived self. We conclude with some 
thoughts on these broader metaphilosophical implications. 
 
2. The Road to Global Expressivism 
Price follows Rorty, Brandom and many other neopragmatists6 in positioning pragmatism as a 
critique of representationalism: the idea that “the function of statements is to ‘represent’ 
worldly states of affairs, and…true statements succeed in doing so” (Price 2011, p. 4). In other 
words, sentences are made true by  and notions such as truth, and objectivity can be explained 
by  a so-called word-world relation. So for instance, “Snow is white” is made true by the 
existence of white snow, which in turn is claimed to explain why the sentence “Snow is white” 
is true.  
     Why would one deny that true sentences represent the world? Certain neopragmatists have 
influentially claimed that many statements endorsed by humans are made not because they 
correspond to worldly facts, but because they are useful. Therefore, any existing items posited 
to ‘truth-make’ those statements are a chimera that unhelpfully masks genuine sources of truth 
in human concerns and purposes. Thus, Rorty asks poignantly what entities might truth-make, 
“History is the story of class struggle” and, “Love is the only law” (Rorty 1982, p. 163), and 
notoriously, in a number of places recommends that philosophers cease talking about truth 
entirely.7  
                                                 
6 See for instance, Michael Williams, “The heart of pragmatism is anti -representationalism” (Williams, in Price 
2013, p. 129). 
7 This is at least some of what Rorty means by his concept of a post -Philosophical culture (Rorty 1982, p. xlii). 
See also: “[truth is] not the sort of thing one should expect to have an interesting philosophical theory about” 
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     Yet at the same time as Price rejects representationalism, and its interpretation of objectivity 
in an independent world, which is nonetheless somehow connected to our words, he is 
concerned to honour naturalism, which he describes as “an ontological doctrine…[that] all 
there is is the world studied by science”, and “an epistemological doctrine…[that] all genuine 
knowledge is scientific knowledge” (Price 2004, p. 73). Price urges that although naturalism is 
generally thought to require representationalism, his representation-free naturalism is superior. 
As noted, Price distinguishes object naturalism, which claims that the proper concern of 
philosophy is “with something in the natural world, or with nothing at all. For there simply is 
nothing else”8 from subject naturalism, which claims that philosophy “needs to begin with 
what science tells us about ourselves” (Price 2013, p. 5). Price argues that subject naturalism 
should ‘come first’ philosophically in an important sense, for object naturalism depends on 
“validation from a subject naturalism perspective”. This simply means that if certain 
presuppositions of object naturalism are incompatible with “the recognition that we humans 
are natural creatures” (Price 2013, p. 6), then they should be rejected. As an example, Price 
proffers what he calls the Placement Problem.9 
     This problem proceeds as follows. As humans, we often seek to explain the world we 
experience. On Price’s recommended subject naturalist approach, we should start this 
explanation with ourselves – this is the Priority Thesis (Price 2004, pp. 73-4). Adhering to this 
recommendation will lead us when developing our naturalism to examine in the first instance 
our “human linguistic usage” – what we say (Price 2004, p. 75). And when we do this, Price 
claims, we will notice a “lack of fit” between certain of our linguistic practices and natural 
science. At various times Price has suggested that the problematic practices include talk about: 
modality, meaning, universals, moral, epistemic and aesthetic norms, and intentionality.10 
     Take ethics for example. In ordinary language we make and endorse statements such as, 
“Stealing is wrong”. This statement appears to attribute a property (wrongness) to an object 
(stealing). But does it? The Placement Problem problematizes where a property of wrongness 
                                                 
(Rorty 1982, p. xiii), “[and we ought to] substitute the idea of ‘unforced agreement’ for that of ‘objectivity’”  
(Rorty 1991, p. 36). 
8 One might wonder at this point what exactly is meant by ‘natural’, but Price doesn’t tell us  any more than that it 
is what is studied by natural science (Price 2011, p. 4). Issues abound here concerning exactly which sciences 
should be thought of as “natural” (psychology? economics? sociology?), and also whether Price is referring to 
facts recognised by current natural science, future natural science, or some kind of idealization of all possible 
scientific inquiry. These issues were well explored regarding physicalism almost 30 years ago in (Crane and 
Mellor 1990). 
9 Price’s Placement Problem owes much to (Jackson 1998), where it is dubbed “The Location Problem”, although 
Price endeavours to distinguish them (Price 2013, p. 27n). 
10 See (Price 1988, 1997a, 2004, 2010, 2011, and 2013). 
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might ‘fit’ in the natural world described by science. How? Price skips lightly over this part of 
the argument, but it is as though he is thinking of reality like a giant container into which 
scientists ‘place’ blocks corresponding to scientific facts as they discover them. It is then 
envisaged that once science has finished its work, and described all the facts, the container is 
‘full’ – there is no room to place any more blocks in it.11  
     Price also offers a somewhat different illustrative metaphor (2011 and 2013), inviting us to 
imagine the relationship between our linguistic practices and the world as a child’s puzzle 
sticker book, where the right-hand side of each page holds a picture of a complex scene, and 
the left hand side a column of peel-off stickers. For each sticker, Price states, the child needs 
to find the corresponding object in the picture (Price 2013, p. 23). He suggests that we think of 
the right-hand side as the world, and the stickers as the set of sentences true of it. Within this 
model, issues of ‘fit’ (or placement) arise insofar as: “We seem to have...more stickers than 
places to put them.” (Price 2013, p. 26). For, he claims, ordinary discourse is ‘rich’ and the 
world described by natural science is ‘sparse’ (Price 2011, p. 4). 
     Price also argues that a key presupposition of The Placement Problem is what he calls “the 
Semantic Ladder”, which derives from representationalism. This is: 
the assumption that the linguistic items in question ‘stand for’ or ‘represent’ something 
non-linguistic…This assumption grounds our shift in focus from the term ‘X’ or concept 
X, to its assumed object, X (Price 2013, p. 9). 
This assumption is required for the Placement Problem, for without it we cannot transition from 
merely studying human linguistic practices (such as ethics talk), to considering their 
implications for the world. So, one may evade the Problem by refusing to climb the Ladder.  
     One form of such philosophical evasion, Price explains, is expressivism, the view that 
although words have meanings, they do not necessarily represent something non-linguistic. 
Rather, we may use words as tools to achieve other purposes. So an expressivist would attempt 
to resolve the Placement Problem for ethics by deciding that our statement “Stealing is wrong”, 
is used not for representing a moral fact, but for functions such as dissuading children from 
certain behaviours. Price turns to Blackburn’s quasi-realism to explain why nevertheless moral 
statements have been thought truth-apt, and why we express them in declarative form – because 
they play a vital function in our daily lives, and thereby express something important about 
ourselves (Price 2013, pp. 29-31). 
                                                 
11 See (Price 2004, pp. 74-75), (Macarthur and Price, 2007, pp. 93-94).  
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     However, crucially, Price then ‘goes global’ with his expressivism. He argues that all words 
are merely tools; none represent anything ‘non-linguistic’  thereby tossing away the Semantic 
Ladder. He concludes that none of the content of our semantic predicates with representational 
purport (such as ‘true’ and ‘represents’) is actually semantic. Previously he has suggested that 
such terms are exhausted by merely syntactical roles – holding a minimalism (e.g. Price 1988). 
More recently he has urged that Brandom’s normative pragmatics of assertion may usefully be 
imported wholesale into his theory (Price 2013, p. 31). His stated reason for the bold move of 
extending expressivism to all statements is that trying to draw a principled distinction between 
areas of discourse which do and do not represent (the so-called Bifurcation Thesis) seems 
excessively complicated: 
A quasi-realist of a more conventional stripe, who does want to hold onto the Bifurcation 
Thesis, is committed to a kind of two-tier view of the landscape...In effect, he must think 
that there are both loose and strict answers to questions such as: What is [it] to be a belief, 
an assertion, a statement...” (Price 2013, p. 30). 
The distinction also seems arbitrary and useless, Price suggests. Since we have managed to 
provide a full explanation of semantic predicates in the merely expressive case (entirely by 
reference to human natural functions), there seems little point in crafting a further account for 
purported descriptive cases – the success of local expressivism will render it “an idle cog”.12  
     Price acknowledges that holding a global expressivism risks draining expressivism of its 
meaning, since ‘expressing’ is usually defined precisely in contrast to ‘representing’ – a charge 
mounted influentially in (Boghossian 1990). But Price claims immunity from the charge as he 
is providing a new (“use-explanatory”) account of expressing that is not defined using 
traditional semantic notions, which are a framework that he simply rejects (Price 2013, pp. 11-
12). As an olive branch to the long history of philosophers’ contrasting representing with non-
representing uses of language, he offers a new distinction, aiming to recapitulate as much of 
the contrast as possible within global expressivism, which he calls e- and i-representation.  
     E-representations are explicated as “environment-tracking” – they co-vary with some 
feature of the world claimed to be external. An example offered is the needle on a fuel gauge 
co-varying with fuel-level in the tank. By contrast, i-representations are defined in terms of the 
“internal functional role” of representation – “its position or role in some cognitive or 
inferential architecture” (Price 2013, p. 36). No example is given of this but perhaps the number 
2 might serve, for its position in a structured network of mathematical concepts. Price claims 
                                                 
12 (Macarthur and Price 2007, pp. 104-109). See also (Price 2013, p. 30.) 
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that the natural way to read this distinction is that i-representations are merely logically 
sophisticated versions of e-representations, understood within an overall representational 
framework. Within global expressivism, though, the distinction must be reconceived, and Price 
suggests (drawing on pragmatism) that the two systems serve different, complementary 
purposes. The purpose of i-representations is “in-game answerability” –  matters such as logical 
consistency, relevance and other aspects of ‘score-keeping in a language-game’, and the 
purpose of e-representations is “environmental answerability” (Price 2013, p. 38). 
‘Environment’ here refers to the world we have in view from the natural sciences, although we 
are not representing it in the traditional sense. How can we be answerable to the natural world 
if we don’t represent it? We merely covary with it (Price 2013, p. 37). We may successfully 
make predictions about it, but our theories are thoroughly infused by the contingencies of our 
particular human purposes (for instance, a theory of causation would be inconceivable for 
creatures that were not agents in the world).    
 
3. Global Expressivism as Anti-Metaphysics 
At this point we reach the reasons for, and the nature of, Price’s repudiation of metaphysics. 
Firstly, Price appears to assume, following Quine, that doing metaphysics is coextensive with 
‘having ontological commitments’.13 Secondly, he assumes that ontological commitments can 
be undertaken only by using language to represent facts in a supposedly external world.14 Given 
these two assumptions, the representationalist claim that there are “substantial word-world 
relations” (Price 2004, p. 78) seems to be all that could be meant by metaphysics.15 It then 
follows that to adopt an expressivist position regarding a given area of discourse is to abandon 
the possibility of that discourse having any ontological commitments, and thus any 
metaphysical import, and to adopt global expressivism is to abandon the possibility of any 
metaphysics whatsoever.  
                                                 
13 This apparent assumption is somewhat puzzling since in a rich discussion in (Price 1997b), Price criticises 
Quine for being too quick to allege that in significant philosophical debates of his day “the crucial issues are 
ontological” (as opposed to, for instance, functional), and also for alleging (against Carnap) that the existential 
quantifier is entirely univocal. And yet without such an assumption, Price’s claim that his global expressivism 
consists in a repudiation of metaphysics simply does not follow. For instance, why cannot exploring the range of 
linguistic functions that human language makes possible itself constitute a metaphysical inquiry? (More on this 
later in the paper.) 
14 This would be an interesting assumption to press on, and not without support from defenders of classical 
pragmatism who have recently begun deploring neopragmatism’s extensive focus on language, arguing that it 
overrides one of pragmatism’s key originating concepts: experience. See for instance (Koopman 2007), (Levine 
2012). 
15 Price goes so far as to state, “…semantic notions such as reference and truth have become instruments in the 
investigative programme of modern metaphysics” (Price 2004, pp. 84-85). 
Commented [A1]: Footnote 13 is all to answer the charge of 
REFEREE #1 that we need to back up our claim that Price is Quinean 
here 
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    It is worth pausing here and noting a certain oddness about this view, particularly as a form 
of naturalism. Is Price claiming that there is no reality? An obvious quick rejoinder here might 
run: Is Price not doing metaphysics precisely in throwing away the Semantic Ladder? Is he not 
denying that all of our terms have reference? And is this not a metaphysical claim? This of 
course echoes a well-rehearsed objection to attempts to abolish metaphysics in 20th century 
philosophy by the logical positivists (Hempel 1976). Price is quite aware of the objection and 
has a well-prepared response. He claims that rather than denying metaphysical claims, he is 
avoiding them, and this is the more profound move (Macarthur and Price 2007, pp. 97-101). 
He also claims that his opponents, in pursuing metaphysical discussion with him, are begging 
the question against his view (Price 2003, pp. 180-183). Here Price echoes Rorty’s famous 
philosophical move with respect to truth: he is not denying that there is truth so much trying to 
change the subject, exhorting philosophers to turn their energies to more worthwhile topics – 
just as, both Rorty and Price suggest, atheists are trying to get us past even talking about God.16 
     Also, Price claims that pragmatists are metaphysical quietists but not quietists tout court 
(“philosophical quietists”). Such quietists take some issues very seriously, he claims, for 
instance anthropological ones (Macarthur and Price 2007, p. 101). Again, it is worth pausing 
and noting a certain prima facie oddness with Price’s view. Is he arguing that anthropology has 
nothing to do with reality? But from his perspective the move to reject metaphysics yet uphold 
anthropology is legitimate, as it precisely quarantines philosophical inquiry within subject 
naturalism. We have now summarised key features of Price’s distinctive neopragmatist 
interpretation of naturalism, and will begin our critique of his claim to repudiate metaphysics.  
 
4. Price’s Dualism 
It should now be clear that Price’s arguments rely on a number of robust two-way distinctions. 
In this section we shall briefly list these, then argue that the use to which Price puts them is 
sufficiently metaphysical to commit him to a de facto dualism. Then we shall suggest some 
ways in which we see dualism as a problematic metaphysics to have, if one is going to have a 
metaphysics. 
     First, and rather oddly, at one point Price explicitly claims to be a dualist, when he postulates 
his two kinds of representation: i- and e-. He claims that these are so entirely different that his 
                                                 
16 (Rorty 1982, p. xiv). See also (Price 2011, pp. 240-41): “Evolutionary biologists don’t think that the species 
were created by God. Does this mean that they must use the term “God”, in their theoretical voice, in order to 
deny that the species were created by God? Obviously not – they simply offer an account of the origin of the 
species in which the term “God” does not appear.” 
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global expressivism is not the nihilism many have imagined, but rather a form of dualism (Price 
2013, p. 44). Although the remark appears somewhat jesting, he is quite correct to point out 
the profound distinctness of i- and e-representations. Why are they so distinct? While the 
former resembles a space of reasons, the latter seems more akin to direct causal interaction 
with objects in the world, and it has often been remarked that reasons are not causes. Yet how 
do these two very different kinds of representation combine into our relatively seamless human 
communication? Price gives no account of this. He merely claims that we should be content to 
have two quite different accounts of communication, and let them “live their separate lives” 
(Price 2013, p. 45). But aren’t there some concepts that might be inferentially analysed and 
covaried with in practice, and in such cases, can we acknowledge and explain how we are 
talking about ‘the same concept’? For example, many concepts in fundamental physics (which 
is of course highly naturalistically respectable) would seem to be precisely of this nature. How 
would Price analyse a phrase such as “two electrons”? He does not say.  
     The apparent dualism between i- and e-representation is puzzling enough, but Price goes on 
to coordinate these two kinds of representation with two kinds of world, also quite distinct: so-
called i- and e-worlds. The former, he claims, corresponds to “the totality of the facts” and the 
latter to “the natural environment” (Price 2013, p. 46). He suggests that there is in fact a range 
of different i-worlds corresponding to different discourses (what Wittgenstein called language-
games), and in a neat move he concludes that the e-world is the i-world of the scientific 
perspective. In moving from ‘representation’ to ‘world’ in such a fashion, isn’t Price now 
himself climbing the dreaded Semantic Ladder? Of course, he denies that his postulation of 
these worlds constitutes an ontological rather than a functional claim (Price 2013, p. 55). Still, 
he seems to be here positing something beyond the e- and i-representations themselves, or why 
bother to define further terms?  
     Price’s argument for his global expressivism also draws crucially on a number of further 
distinctions between ‘representation-like entities’ and ‘world-like entities’, which would 
appear to treat the two as effectively different ‘realms’. Examples include contrasts between 
“linguistic data” and “the objects themselves” (Price 2013, p. 7), a “linguistic conception” of 
naturalism and a “material conception” (Price 2013, p. 8), and the “near end” and “far end” of 
“the semantic relation” (Price and Macarthur, 2007, p. 96). Given how Price construes the 
distinction between i- and e-representation as two different kinds of representation, and appears 
to posit something beyond the different kind of representations themselves, even though he 
would deny any ontologising move here, and given the strict distinctions Price maintains 
between the linguistic and the objectual, there is good reason to regard these three points as 
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functioning metaphysically, in that they are concerned with a sufficiently general inquiry into 
the nature and structure of reality. To sum up, then, we read Price as a kind of ‘word-world 
dualist’. 
     Why is dualism an unsatisfactory metaphysics for a pragmatist? Interesting observations 
were made here by pragmatism’s originator, Charles Peirce. Peirce wrote that dualism, 
“performs its analysis with an axe, leaving as the ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being” 
(Peirce CP, 7.570). Why is that problematic? Because along with any relatedness between the 
“chunks”, one removes the in-principle possibility of any bridging explanations between them. 
This consequence can be seen clearly in the so-called “Mind-Body Problem”, which grew from 
Cartesian mind-body dualism to bedevil modern philosophy with the mystery of how the 
allegedly self-contained substance of thought could act on the allegedly self-contained 
substance of matter.  
     We see the same in-principle inexplicability in Price. For instance, we’ve seen him 
explicitly refuse to explain how i- and e- representations ‘gear together’ to constitute a 
language. Yet the question of how in-game answerability and environmental answerability 
might relate within communication seems prima facie both sensible and important. (The 
question seems particularly important where the interlocutors are navigating a mutually 
intelligible world as agents – a feature which pragmatism distinctively highlights as crucial.) 
Nor does Price attempt to explain how i- and e- representations manage to signify i- and e-
worlds respectively, and it’s not clear how he can. (For instance: how can environmental 
answerability be understood to “answer to” the e-world, given that Price has thrown away the 
Semantic Ladder?). Nor does he explain how his i- and e-worlds relate to one another (if they 
do). And, moreover, he does not see any of this as a problem! We submit that such unconcern 
is crucially anti-naturalistic. Science only progresses by paying attention to currently 
unexplained phenomena, and trying to explain them, and a necessary condition for achieving 
this aim is that one want an explanation. We shall now address the second major metaphysical 
assumption in Price’s views that we wish to highlight.  
 
5. Price’s Nominalism 
We have seen Price argue that the apparent force of the Placement Problem lends weight to 
various forms of expressivism, which seem better suited than their more metaphysically-
inclined rivals to make sense of things. Similarly, nominalism about universals often appears 
far more naturalistically kosher than any variety of realism about universals. This is because 
10 
 
Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment (which we have seen Price draw on crucially) 
seems denuded of any metaphysical commitment to queer entities with queer semantic 
properties. Rather, the explanation for why it is true to state that something is red lies simply 
in how the term ‘redness’, or the predicate ‘is red’, applies to an object – the truth-conditions 
of a proposition such as ‘The chair is brown’, then, are the following: x (some object) is f (some 
property), because there exists a term which designates x and that ‘f’ applies to x (cf. Devitt 
1997, p. 96).  
     But what if it turned out that nominalism is a key feature of Price’s neopragmatism?  
Claudine Tiercelin notes in her review of Naturalism without Mirrors, “Price has virtually 
nothing to say … on realism about universals” (Tiercelin 2013, p. 664). This appears to stem 
from Price’s metaphysical quietism. As we have seen, like Quine and Rorty before him, Price 
aims to replace the vocabulary of the metaphysician with a putatively more reasonable account 
of propositional discourse which avoids any metaphysical vocabulary, just as a Good 
Darwinian provides a convincing explanation for apparently brilliant design solutions in the 
biological world without mentioning God.  
      Price and Macarthur will argue that metaphysical quietism does not entail nominalism, 
since the latter is a specific genus of anti-realist metaphysics – it “retains a metaphysical face: 
it maintains that literally speaking” (Macarthur and Price 2007, p. 98), there are no universals. 
In contrast, they urge, metaphysical quietism rejects all metaphysical talk, whether negative or 
positive assertion (Macarthur and Price 2007, p. 98). However, we shall now argue that 
metaphysical quietism is self-refuting to the extent that Price must eventually concede that his 
critique of metaphysics is made on nominalist grounds. One helpful way of explicating our 
critique of Price here is that he makes the same mistake Rorty made when conceiving of 
pragmatism as necessarily anti-metaphysics.17  
      Rorty understands metaphysics as the kind of view Hilary Putnam has dubbed 
‘metaphysical realism’, according to which:  
the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one 
true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’. Truth involves some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of 
things (Putnam 1981, p. 49).  
This ‘God’s-eye-view’ understanding of metaphysics is summed up by Rorty in a later work: 
“I use ‘metaphysics’ as the name of the belief in something non-human which justifies our deep 
attachments” (Rorty 2001, p. 89). By presenting metaphysics as comprising ‘non-human’ 
                                                 
17 Cf. (Giladi 2015). 
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dimensions which transcend our social and cultural practice, Rorty regards it as the great 
nemesis of pragmatism.18 Yet Rorty is committed to a conception of human beings as 
normative, self-reflecting, discursive agents. But by conceiving of ourselves in this way, he is 
inevitably engaging in some kind of general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality, as 
humans are (of course) themselves part of reality. Once again, then, such claims constitute 
some variety of metaphysics as we have defined it, although they do not involve any appeal to 
onto-theological categories, nor transcend the bounds of sense. Rather, this nuanced genus of 
metaphysics is a form of naturalism, according to which we understand what it is to be human 
in terms of having a particular set of natural capacities. In this way, then Rorty’s anti-
metaphysical pragmatism is self-refuting.  
      Rorty’s mistake can be equally attributed to Price’s functional pluralism about meaning. If 
all worlds are just artefacts of particular discourses, and therefore contingent to human 
purposes, then Price’s global expressivism, and distinction between e- and i- representations, 
must itself constitute just another discourse. Such a discourse might readily be engaged in 
alongside further discourse claiming that global expressivism is false, if it serves some human 
purpose to do so, since there are no external facts to ground the necessity of avoiding 
contradiction (and the need to avoid contradiction within i-representations appears to be game-
specific, in this view). In response, Price may object that his distinction between in-game 
answerability and environment answerability is not simply a difference between kinds of 
discourse, since as noted the notion of ‘environment’ refers to the world we have in view from 
natural sciences such as physics. However, if so, Price must recognise that the natural sciences 
themselves draw on important metaphysical presuppositions. These include: (1) there exists a 
theory-independent, external world; (2) the world investigated by physics is knowable by 
humans; (3) the explanations of physics potentially apply across all of reality. Price’s picture-
book metaphor itself arguably leans heavily on these presuppositions: (1) in positing the 
‘picture on the right hand side’ of the book, (2) in imagining that stickers have an intelligible 
‘place’ in that picture, and (3) the claim (crucial for motivating the Placement Problem) that 
for every place in the picture there exists a sticker (‘phrased’ in the language of natural science) 
to ‘fill’ it. 
      Once metaphysics is so understood, it is clearly impossible for the naturalist not have 
metaphysical commitments in some way or another. This unavoidability of metaphysics is 
                                                 
18 “[t]he pragmatist … does not think of himself as any kind of metaphysician” (Rorty 1982, p.  xxviii).  
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unsurprisingly reflected in the ubiquity of metaphysical concepts in language.19 A similar claim 
is made by Jonathan Lowe:  
“[i]n my view, all other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions – thus 
making metaphysics unavoidable – so that we should at least endeavour to do metaphysics 
with our eyes open, rather than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of 
uncritical assumption” (Lowe 1998, p. v).  
      If metaphysical quietism is self-refuting, then Price needs an alternative justification for his 
critique of metaphysics. What is left? Only, it would appear, Quinean nominalist basic 
inclinations for understanding reality as a desert landscape. This is exactly the kind of move 
that Price has strenuously tried to avoid in developing his particular variety of (subject) 
naturalism as akin to a genus of linguistic anthropology – so that (as noted) the linguistic 
anthropologist is conceived of as “being silent in one’s theoretical voice about whether 
[semantic] terms refer or have truth-conditions” (Price 2004, p.  80).  
     While Price insists that the subject naturalist is quiet on these matters, his variety of semantic 
deflationism in fact appears to make more noise than he is willing to countenance: for, central 
to Price’s subject naturalism is the “idea that the only semantic resources theorists of language 
need are minimalist ones about which there is little, in general, to say beyond the trivial 
disquotational schemas …” (Macarthur 2008, p. 206). Such an idea appears to be very much 
in the spirit of Quine’s nominalist semantic theory sketched above. Under such a theory, one 
does not need to be committed to the existence of a universal to make the proposition true: one 
needs only correctly apply a term to a particular. From this formal perspective, there appears 
to be a significant parallel between Quine and Price: both claim that one needs only minimal 
semantic resources to make sense of the relevant phenomena, and to insist on only minimal 
resources is itself symptomatic of nominalist dispositions. Not only that, Price’s very subject 
naturalism arguably presupposes nominalism insofar as it assumes that ‘the subject’ can be 
divorced from its broader context of surrounding objects (the experienced world), and studied 
separately – which assumes the subject to be a discrete individual, rather than, for instance, a 
node in a web of internal relations.  
     In conclusion, then, we have shown that Price’s neopragmatism makes serious metaphysical 
assumptions on at least two fronts. We don’t blame him for this, metaphysics is unavoidable 
for a philosopher. But we will now make some suggestions about how, when metaphysics is 
given its due and properly integrated, pragmatism might look.  
 
                                                 
19 See (Ellis 2002) and (Lowe 2006).  
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6. What is Naturalism? What is Metaphysics? 
We will now briefly discuss the concepts of naturalism and metaphysics, comparing how Price 
thinks they should be understood within pragmatism with our own views.  
6.1 Naturalism 
We saw that Price defines naturalism as “an ontological doctrine…[that] all there is is the world 
studied by science”, and “an epistemological doctrine…[that] all genuine knowledge is 
scientific knowledge” (Price, 2004, pp. 73). To us, this ontological doctrine sounds rather 
empty. Of course, the world that is, is the world that is studied by science – what other world 
could science study? This definition does not in any way determine the nature of that world, 
yet is this not something one might hope for from an ontological doctrine? The epistemological 
doctrine is also quite vague. Reading generously would seem to require understanding it as 
claiming that the only genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. (Strictly as stated, the 
doctrine leaves the possibility open that all genuine knowledge and all non-genuine knowledge 
might be scientific knowledge.) And what makes knowledge ‘scientific’? No guidance is given 
on this.   
     We believe that the best understanding of naturalism for pragmatism, with its guiding 
interest in practice over theory, is neither ontological nor epistemological but methodological. 
It’s worth noting that the scientific knowledge, and the worlds it describes, which are invoked 
by Price’s epistemological and ontological claims respectively, changes significantly over 
time. Pragmatists have always taught that scientific knowledge, understood as a product of 
inquiry, is fallible, revisable, and multi-dimensional and moves through various stages and 
positions in an attempt to achieve rational satisfaction. A more lasting  and thereby arguably 
more essential   aspect of science is such aspects of its methods that endure while specific 
scientific beliefs come and go.20 Of course, giving an account of such methods which covers 
the vast variety of sciences currently pursued is a high-level task that must be approached in a 
very general manner. Nevertheless, we believe that classical pragmatism made useful progress 
on it. For instance, Peirce taught that one absolutely key aspect is practices of self-correction: 
If a man burns to learn and sets himself to comparing his ideas with experimental results 
in order that he may correct those ideas, every scientific man will recognize him as a 
brother, no matter how small his knowledge may be (Peirce CP, 1.44). 
                                                 
20 It must be noted that Peirce claims that scientific method also develops to some degree: “…every work of 
science great enough to be well remembered for a few generations affords some exemplification of the defective 
state of the art of reasoning of the time when it was written; and each chief step in science has been a lesson in 
logic.” (Peirce CP, 5.363). But it develops more slowly.  
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Note how neatly Peirce here separates scientific practice from merely holding scientific 
knowledge (Price’s ‘epistemological doctrine’), by observing that one may possess swathes of 
knowledge of the physical world, but if one is not committed to extending it further, but rather 
is committed to defending it come what may, then one is not a true scientist. Conversely, one 
can hold very little scientific knowledge but still be a genuine scientist if one is working 
diligently to increase one’s epistemic ‘widow’s mite’. This is arguably the key idea behind 
empiricism, and what made it so attractive as the philosophical representative of the ‘new 
sciences’ through the 17th and 18th centuries. For “look to the world of experience!” means, 
“look beyond your current beliefs!”    
    Peirce argues (empirically) that the source of these empiricist practices can ultimately only 
be a certain kind of personal character and motivation. He writes of a class of “men” (people): 
…to whom nothing seems great but reason. If force interests them, it is not in its exertion, 
but in that it has a reason and a law. For men of [this] class, [nature] is a cosmos, so 
admirable, that to penetrate to its ways seems to them the only thing that makes life worth 
living…Those are the natural scientific men; and they are the only men that have any real 
success in scientific research (Peirce CP, 1.43). 
Why is character and motivation so important? As Susan Haack has noted, it is because there 
is such a thing as sham reasoning. This occurs “where it is no longer the reasoning which 
determines what the conclusion shall be, but it is the conclusion which determines what the 
reasoning shall be” (CP 1.57). Possibly even worse is fake reasoning, whose practitioners 
ignore truth altogether and are merely arguing to look clever, get promoted or receive other 
epistemically extrinsic rewards. Frustratingly, these reasonings are frequently impossible to 
tell apart from reasonings that lead toward truth by their outward form alone. As Haack also 
astutely notes:  
the intelligence that will help a genuine inquirer figure things out will help a sham or fake 
reasoner suppress unfavourable evidence more effectively, or devise more impressively 
obscure formulations (Haack 1996, §7). 
That we cannot determine from a form of reasoning alone whether it is truth-directed is in fact 
exactly what we should expect from a genuine empiricism, or knowledge by experience. But 
the genuine lover of truth will not be satisfied with sham or fake reasoning, by definition, and 
Peirce claims that there is no epistemic tool, technique, logic or premise that can inoculate us 
against it, other than this ardent desire. Many pragmatists argue that we need to understand 
these matters in order to understand scientific practice, and thus, naturalism.  
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ii) Metaphysics 
We saw that for Price metaphysics consists in the holding of ontological commitments 
understood solely as specific objects in the world which ‘hang off’ our true sentences and (to 
use his picture-book metaphor) have the same ‘shape’, somehow. Metaphysics can involve 
much more than this, and has done so in a rich tradition stretching back 2000 years. We think 
it a pity that Price did not consider a few alternative conceptions of the discipline before 
dismissing it so wholeheartedly. Here are just a few examples: 
 Metaphysics was defined by Aristotle as the study of being qua being, meaning what 
can be asserted about anything that exists just because of its existence and not because 
of any special qualities it has. Price might have adapted this conception to his 
minimalistic subject naturalism in interesting ways. For instance, he might have 
focussed on the subject as a ‘pure I’, constituted by existence rather than essence. This 
would have delivered to his pragmatism an existentialist twist which could have been 
most intriguing to develop. 
 Jonathan Lowe defined metaphysics as a series of general enquiries into the 
fundamental structure of reality as a whole (Lowe 2002, pp. 2-3). Similarly, Adrian 
Moore (following Wilfrid Sellars) wrote, “Metaphysics is the most general attempt to 
make sense of things” (Moore 2012, p. 1). We have already urged that such a general 
enquiry is also a goal of naturalism. Natural scientists not only do a great deal of 
detailed fact-finding, but also develop theories of the world’s overall structure. Price 
qua naturalist might have made good use of this scientific conception of metaphysics. 
 Paul Forster writes: “The task of the metaphysician … is to think through the 
implications of the theory of inquiry for our general concept of reality” (Forster 2011, 
p. 176). In this spirit he draws metaphysical implications from his own theory of 
inquiry, such as a particular (semiotically inflected) form of realism about universals. 
This inquiry-led approach to metaphysics is particularly pragmatist, and since human 
beings would appear to be the inquiring species, Price’s subject naturalism with its 
focus on human linguistic practices might have served as a wonderful platform for this 
kind of investigation.  
Even within analytic philosophy there are more conceptions of metaphysics on the table than 
Price acknowledges, as Paul Horwich has noted.21 For instance, an influential new movement 
critiques Quine’s overwhelming focus on “existence questions”, the answers to which are 
                                                 
21 See (Horwich, 2013, pp. 113-121). 
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“extracted from our best theory”, suggesting that more important are questions concerning what 
grounds what, what is “ontologically primary”. When it comes to philosophically contested 
entities such as numbers, Jonathan Schaffer notes, “the philosophical question is not whether 
such things exist but how they do” (Schaffer 2009, p. 352)22 – do they supervene on the physical 
world, or not? Once again, such ‘grounding’ questions could be very interesting naturalist 
questions for Price to explore. For instance, are i-representations grounded in human practices 
(as Price’s linguistic functionalism would seem to require), and if so, in what way? Are i-
representations grounded in e-representations, given that human language is just one among 
many natural phenomena, and if so, in what way?  
 
7. Conclusion  
Metaphysics is far from a worthless intellectual enterprise, but has an important role in finding 
our place in the Universe. (We might call this our own humble, human “Placement Problem”.) 
By pursuing a sufficiently general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality, metaphysics 
seeks to render a natural order that is arguably non-anthropocentric rationally intelligible to 
human mindedness. It is helpful at this point to turn to Hegel, who offers such an explanation 
of metaphysics’ significance:     
It is true that Newton expressly warned physics to beware of metaphysics; but … let it 
be said that he did not conduct himself in accordance with this warning at all. Only the 
animals are true blue physicists by this standard, since they do not think: whereas 
humans, in contrast, are thinking beings, and born metaphysicians. All that matters here 
is whether the metaphysics that is employed is of the right kind: and specifically 
whether…we hold on to one-sided thought-determinations fixed by the understanding, 
so that they form the basis of our theoretical and of our practical action (Hegel 1991, 
§98Z, 156). 
For Hegel, the principal advantage of drawing a distinction between the mere understanding 
alluded to above, and his broader category of reason, is that we can avoid various problematic 
dualisms which are the inevitable consequence of purely analytical methods of reflection, 
which force us into contradictions and aporias. Reason provides inquirers with the means to 
avoid these pitfalls by thinking dialectically – drawing distinctions yet at the same time 
establishing interconnectedness to a whole. A metaphysics which conflates reason with 
understanding, will therefore not be a maximally useful metaphysics, insofar as it results in a 
one-sided conception of thought and a purely mechanistic conception of philosophic 
                                                 
22 See also (Schaffer 2012). 
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explanation.  In these ways, then, Hegel offers us a recognisably pragmatist conception of 
metaphysics. 
     That metaphysics seems to keep returning from attempts to abolish it, and is experiencing a 
powerful resurgence in contemporary analytic philosophy may signal just how important the 
discipline is to humans. Metaphysics at its best seems to reveal what is crucial to inquiry – 
namely “radically new concepts by which to live” (Moore 2012, p.  20). As such, the effort to 
make sense of things is not just an exercise in representing states of affairs, it is also an exercise 
in finding ways for human beings to realise themselves through practices of understanding the 
nature of reality and our place in it. And aren’t such practices a goal to which pragmatists have 
always aspired? Price’s oeuvre also presents us with a picture of how we fit in the Universe, 
but, we suggest – not a happy one. For instance, we have seen that the ‘priority’ he gives to 
subject naturalism precisely assumes that the human subject can be divorced from its broader 
context (a directly experienced world), and studied separately. The ensuing dualism and 
nominalism invoke the ‘natural’ world as a desert landscape devoid of nonanthropocentric 
intelligibility, and conceive of inquiry as involving a sparse conception of discourse which 
seeks to limit the kinds of conversation one can have. If it is true, as we have argued, that 
metaphysics consists in a general inquiry into the nature and structure of reality, to try to block 
it seems a puzzling exercise in epistemic self-harm. We close with warnings from Putnam: 
In every philosopher there is a part that cries, “This enterprise [of metaphysics] is vain 
frivolous, crazywe must say “Stop!”, and a part that cries, “This enterprise is simply 
reflection at the most general and abstract level; to put a stop to it would be a crime against 
reason. (Putnam 1988, p. 457) 
and Peirce: 
Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics…and you have 
found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized 
metaphysics with which they are packed….Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to 
have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far better, then, that that metaphysics should 
be criticized and not be allowed to run loose. (Peirce CP, 1.129) 
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